Viktor Orbáns Politik der Entrechtung | Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik

Wenn ich in jüngster Zeit – und leider immer öfter – gefragt werde, wieso im Westen niemand hat kommen sehen, dass in Ungarn, dem scheinbar zivilisierten Musterland der europäischen Integration, quasi über Nacht ein antiwestliches, antidemokratisch-autoritäres Regime an die Macht gelangte, so lautet meine ehrliche Antwort: weil wir uns selbst und damit auch Euch belogen haben.

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"Il y a quelques temps j'avais du mal à réaliser ma revue de presse sur la Hongrie, alors que maintenant...". Dániel Fehér hausse les sourcils d'un air épuisé. Après notre interview il est attendu ailleurs. Ses journées sont chargées depuis que le Premier ministre hongrois, Viktor Orbán, occupe le devant de la scène européenne à la suite d'une série de lois controversées : atteintes à la liberté de la presse et de la Justice, Parlement monopolisé par la majorité, relents nationalistes importants et fin de l'indépendance d'institutions, notamment de la Banque Centrale, au cœur du contentieux avec Bruxelles.

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Hongrie : "Il y a de l'espoir, mais sur le long terme"

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Das albanische Parlament hat eine Gesetzesvorlage zum Import von Müll verabschiedet. Aus der Opposition gibt es heftige Kritik – eigentlich will das Land seine Tourismusbranche ausbauen.

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The causes for this are manifold, here I just want to focus on two crucial aspects:

1. communication as part of policy making, and
2. the ability of the bureaucratic apparatus to adapt to modern patterns of mass communication.

Political communication can never be successful without good policies. The limits of what communication units can achieve are fundamentally set by the character of the decision making process. Notwithstanding the billions of euros put into communication budgets, if the deliberative process that shapes EU directives and regulations is effectively restricted to input from Member State emissaries and armies of specialised lobbyists, there is no way that preaching about the "results" could penetrate the masses beyond those already involved.

Wallström's concept of how to communicate Europe did actually realise this – but the actions based on this observation ultimately failed to be more than interesting experiments, the connection to the world outside was not made. And the reason for this is clear. The ivory tower – Brussels eurocrats and national administrations alike – is not yet ready to let some of its concentrated power go in exchange for more legitimacy.

The other reason is far simpler to describe and probably also to address: The institutional bureaucracy who is in charge of communications has a concept of mass communications that could not be more disconnected from reality. The general approach not much different from classical propaganda.  That applies not only to DG COMM but also to the communication units of all DGs and agencies, as well as to the overwhelming majority of task officers in charge of administering communication projects.

However, contrary to accusations by diehard eurosceptic fundamentalists, it is less about the urge of brainwashing the population than about the inability of taking risks, both on behalf of the institution as a whole but also on the level of the individual functionaries. We could now, of course, go into detail about how much risk taking you can expect from people who decide that being the small wheel in the big machine is a satisfying job as long as the salary and the pensions scheme is reliable (no offense meant, I would not want to criticise anyone for such a decision). But generally the approach taken can be described as "safety first" and the problem here is not only that the effectiveness of this approach is heavily limited, rather that it is built on a totally illusional idea of how mass communications in the age of blogs, tweets and social networking is functioning.

To describe how it actually works, one should imagine a scale that says "Control" on the one and "Reach" on the other end. The basic point is, the more you let your "message" go and have its own life, the better your chances are to get it out to a broad audience. On the other hand, if you think you can afford to broadcast your viewpoint not caring about the interests of your targeted audience you will be fast to discover the limits of how deep this message will be able to penetrate public opinion.

There is just one little problem with that scale. The "Control" end – if it ever existed – is being eaten away by modern communication technologies. Even the most control freak states like China are in a constant and most likely futile struggle to keep their finger on the topics of public discourse. In a far more open information and opinion market like Europe, the idea of being able to shape public discourse in your favour and avoid all kinds of criticism by having all levels of the hierarchy approving everything from press releases to Facebook status updates and comments on your news sites is not only ridiculous but dangerously illusional, for it creates a false sense of security. And it gives you all the disadvantages concerning the lack of outreach without the advantages of being able to shape your brand according to your own intentions.

The advice one can give to the authorities is an ancient piece of taoist wisdom – the principle of "doing by not doing". Being more in charge by not trying so hard to be in charge. Embarking on the communication channels and habits of our age instead of fighting them. This would actually help the institutions to regain initiative and influence. And this does go beyond our second point and touches also upon the first one, i.e. about engaging citizens in the deliberative process: If the EU desires to be not just feared and loathed but also respected and loved, it should try to be more relaxed and democratic both when talking the talk and when walking the walk.